The Battle for LZ Neville

Golf 3/12

Prelude

In the early morning of February 25, 1969, Marines on two remote fire support bases near the Laotian border came under heavy NVA attack, suffering 145 casualties. The following is a section from the complete story. This part covers "LZ Neville"

The story below was taken from an article written by Janie Blankenship for the "Veterans of Foreign War" (VFW) Magazine. It was part of a series named "Deadliest Vietnam Battles" The article was titled...

By Janie Blankenship

(For VFW Magazine)

Introduction

During the post-1969 Tet Offensive, Marines at Fire Support Base Neville and Russell were attacked nearly simultaneously in the early morning hours of February 25, 1969; North Vietnamese Army (NVA) sapper units numbering about 200 at each site, loxcated just five miles apart, penetrated the bases, killing a total of 39 Americans. The NVa's goal was to destroy the artillery pieces and the gun pits.

Pre-emptive air strikes on enemy positions in this region were not permitted because there was a no-bombing policy in effect due to the ongoing peace talks in Paris. When the bloodshed was over that day, neither firefight was given any publicity. Nor has it been the subject of much attention in the past 39 years.

These are the stories of the men who fought at FSB Neville on that fateful day...

Neville: Like a 'Horror Movie'

At FSB Neville, just five miles west of Russell, the night looked like something "right out of a horror movie with fog drifting through the trees," according to Captain  John Knight Jr., Hotel Company commander.

Three guns from Golf Battery, 3rd battalion 12th Marines, 3rd Marine Division and two platoons from Hotel Comapny, 2nd Battalion 4th Marines were in place to defend the base. A detachment from Golf 2/4 joined Hotel's platoons on the perimeter.

Lieutenant Colonel Joesph Hopkins, commanding officer of 2/4, described Neville as a "very rocky piece of ground" that often got overwhelmed by low-lying clouds, making it more difficult to navigate.

Harry Williams, communications chief for Hotel Company, recalled Neville being about the size of a football field, with a sheer cliff on one side. he had only been on the hill about a week when the sappers made their way on to the base, via the steep cliff.

Outside the perimeter, about 200 soldiers from the 246th NVA Regiment threw grenades at the Marines from the south and the east. Meanwhile, they tried to draw fire by making a great deal of noise with wooden sticks and metal banging against rocks. Somehow, the enemy has automatic weapons set up inside the perimeter of the base.

"Enemy artillery, machine-gun fire and mortars pounded the hill," Sergeant Terry Webber said. "The earth trembled and the noise was deafening. I felt as if the world was ending that foggy night."

According to Charles Garber, who served with Hotel Company, the sappers first killed a two-man radio team. "It was appearent the sapper unit had conducted some very successful recon patrols on Neville to know the location of the radio team," he said.

The sappers crisscrossed the west side of the perimeter, killing anyone who got in their way. But Marines were undeterred. "We beat those sappers, which are suspossed to be the worst thing the North Vietnamese have," recalled Gunnery Sergeant John Timmermeyer. "We beat these people not with air, not with arty,  not with any supporting arms. we beat them, and we beat them bad with weapons we had in our own company. We didn't have to have supporting arms. We did it without them."

Robert Chatigny remembers running out of M-16 ammo, but using the weapons just the same. "We listened for their voices and movement until they were close enough thatf we could hit them with our M-16's as if using a baseball bat," said Chatigny, who served with 2nd Platoon from Golf Company.

After the battle, NVA bodies were found with satchel charges strapped to their backs, intending to kill themselves in an attempt to seize the hill. Their body count was 42. Maps, battle plans, and opium were discovered on some of the bodies.

The Marines lost 14 men on Neville and 29 wounded. Garber remembers the ground being so rocky they could not bury the enemy bodies, so battalion headquarters said to burn them. Hospitalman Corpsman 2nd Class Walter Phillip Seel Jr., Corporal Jeffery Baron and Lance Corporal Thomas Mcgrath all received Silver Stars posthumously for their actions on Neville.

two days later, the ammo dump there was hit by mortar fire resulting in a cook-off. Sergeant Alfred La Porte jr. from 2nd Platoon, Hotel Company raced around picking up burning rounds and tossing them off the cliff. He was later awarded the Navy Cross for his actions.

All told, 38 Marines and one member of the Army 's Special Forces were KIA and 106 were WIA in about three hours of hellish fighting in the fog and misty rain on Neville.

A Personal Account:

A report of the battle below as told by Al Cortez from Golf Battery, 3rd Battalion 12th Marines who participated in the defense of FSB Neville...

Al Cortez - Golf 3/12

In the early morning hours of February 25,1969,  FSB Neville, located northeast of the Elliott Combat Base was defended by two platoons from  Hotel Company, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, and Battery G, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines. The small FSB was protected by concertina wire, tanglefoot, listening posts, mines and sensors; it was assaulted by 200 highly trained and motivated Sappers (personal carrying satchel charge explosives) from the 246th NVA Regiment. During the time of the attack it was misty, very foggy, and visibility was almost nil.

The first indication anything was wrong came at 2400H when one of their Sappers set off a flare while the North Vietnamese were infiltrating our position. Thirty minutes later at 0030H, the gun firing H & I's (harassing & interdiction fires) and the perimeter area with the M-60's were under attack by Sappers.

The intent of Sappers is to penetrate any position they attack forcing the defenders to fight on "two fronts," one inside their perimeter and against the main force which follows the infiltration of the Sappers.  It becomes confusing, terrifying, and chaotic until the inside of the perimeter is re-secured.

After infiltrating the concertina wire on the west side of the perimeter, the attacking North Vietnamese force systematically crisscrossed the western portion of the fire base occupied by the 1st platoon and Battery G's number 6 Gun pit, tossing satchel charges, which forced the defenders into bunkers that were systematically destroyed by the attacking NVA forces.

In the glow of flares and smell of burning powder, we Marines rallied with the assistance of 60mm mortar fire and drove the attacking force from the hill. 

"We beat these Sappers, which are suppose to be the worse the North Vietnamese got," noted Gunnery Sergeant John E. Timmermeyer, Hotel-2/4.

At dawn, Captain McKnight's Hotel-2/4 Marines had lost 11 killed (KIA) and 29 wounded. When NVA Sappers penetrated Gun 6's parapet, Golf Battery Marines fought back; some battery Marines fighting hand-to-hand recovering the gun pit the enemy had occupied. 17 NVA were killed by Golf Battery. A total of 34 dead NVA were found inside the wire of FSB Neville.

Golf Battery lost three brother Marines from that unforgettable day: Corporal Jeffrey Barron, La Puente, California., Lance Corporal Thomas McGrath, Homewood, Illinois., and our Corpsmen HM3 Walter Seel. I also lost a friend, a fellow Marine from Hotel-2/4 whom I had just met.

Semper Fi,

Al Cortez - Golf 3/12

Additional remembrance...

Mike Robinson - History of LZ Neville

I have always referred to this time, through the time the 3rd Marine Division departed Vietnam as the post Khe Sanh period. I did become acclimated to the weather as much as anyone can. I also realize I had been sent to exactly the place I wanted to be at before I joined the Marines.

The war on the Demilitarized Zone had moved on from Con Thien to Khe Sanh (Webmaster's note: The war on the DMZ initially started in skirmish's on or near the DMZ in 1966 then shifted in intensity to Gio Linh in late February, 1967, escalating to the first NVA use of artillery on 20 March 1967 against the Marine 105 battery Charlie 1/12 at the Gio Linh outpost; inserted the same day of the attack was Golf 3/12, Operation Beacon Hill. about 500 meters N-NW of the firebase. The focus then changed to Con Thien in late April/early May of 1967.) and the roads end on Route 9 at the time was three miles past Vandergrift Combat Base at Ca Lu. That's where Golf Battery was at; Ca Lu was the forward deployed base for the 4th Marine Regiment. 3rd Battalion 12th Marines was the artillery support unit for the 4th Marines. Golf Battery was the direct support unit for 1st Battalion 4th Marines.

In late September Golf Battery went back into Khe Sanh valley and took up support position in the mountains to the north of the abandoned airstrip. Hotel Battery was putting together LZ Cates a few kilometers east of Khe Sanh.

On my first chopper ride ever into that valley I remember the old base coming into view. I was shocked when I first saw it, a big, red, dirt splotch on the valley floor with bomb craters in every direction, all with water in them. The steel mat runway was still in place and six aircraft parking revampments. that was it, nothing else. As the chopper neared the base I looked out the starboard porthole and saw a little bald spot on a hill below. A thin trail wound up to it from the valley and wound away from it on the other side. I remember thinking how small it looked and it could only hold a squad or so on it. I said to myself I was glad I wasn't on that hill as we [passed it. Well,  just then the chopper pitched over to starboard and started corkscrewing down onto the hilltop. I said "oh great, that is where I am going."

We were placed on LZ Quantico for an upcoming Forth Marines operation. We fired prep fires for the operation and the 4th Marines landed near the village and humped north to the airstrip. The 3rd Marine Division Band was choppered in and all the brass from MAC V the press came too and a lot of used boots. The boots were put into formation. the brass made speeches about how we didn't need bases like Khe Sanh. That we would stay fluid and not get bogged down by fixed positions. (OH, now that last sentence. Remember it for later in this story.) The band marched up and down the runway and played music. The press documented the whole thing. Then it was over. Hotel Battery went and started LZ Russell. Golf Battery went northwest to start LZ Alpine with the 155mm howitzers following a few days later. The two 105 battery's and the three 155mm howitzers along with a bunch of grunts were on there own out there. The other 105 battery jumped over to the Laotian boarder to start LZ Argon. LZ Argon was supported by LZ Alpine and it got a bad reputation right off the bat. LZ Alpine was masked from artillery support by the over mile high peak of Tiger Mountain (Tiger Tooth). We couldn't stay in that area long. Overlapping artillery support was necessary and we were not tied off to the road head.

                           

By mid December the other batteries out there had moved back to supported areas. Golf Battery had moved to and started LZ Neville on hill 1103 eight clicks to the Northeast. On a ridgeline leading to Tiger Tooth three clicks to its south. It would be supported by Hotel Battery on LZ Russell nine clicks to the Northwest.

Now what we were doing and why? Our two batteries were in out positions from the divisions main fire and support positions. Hotel Battery was situated northwest of Camp Elliot at the Rock Pile and if It wasn't on that hilltop massive effective mortar and rocket attacks would have rained down onto Camp Elliot from that area. Those attacks would come directly from across the DMZ to the North. Hotel Battery saved lives. Now Golf Battery on LZ Neville did the same job however it was primarily protecting Vandergrift Combat Support Base. The reason it was so much farther out was Tiger Tooth Mountain. That mountain had a ridgeline that extended from it to the East called Nui Ta Pong. That ridge would be the launching point for many attacks on Vandergrift CSB. LZ Neville could get a good shot down the West side of that mountain interdicting supplies from getting to the NVA on Tiger Tooth. With an occasional recon team and do wacky do type things we could and for the most part did keep supplies in mass from reaching there launching points. Tiger Tooth always was Charlie's hill just as Dong Ha Mountain was Charlie's OP overlooking our positions. The NVA on Tiger Tooth Mountain kept a Coleman type lantern on every night till very late. It was on the West side of the hill near its top. I figured they had a card game going every night. We fired at it a few times. The light would go out for a few minuets then as soon as we secured our guns it came back on. Tiger Tooth would be best supplied from the West in Laos. A narrow valley led straight to it from the West right by LZ Argon and by the base of LZ Alpine.

LZ Neville was a miserable location. It was located on a ridgeline running east west with a cliff on its northern side and slop to its south. I'll stop short of calling it triple canopy jungle. I'll just call it short jungle. Thirty feet high or so. Very thick jungle. Thick jungle was good. Even a sapper unit can't get through it quietly. A sniper might but that's what we had dogs for.  NOW DOGS.              

                                                                  

I have a problem with this subject of our dogs. Craton Abrums shame on you wherever you are. It was your job to let the word slip out by back channeling it to dog lovers in the USA that they were going to be killed. And what jerk did that job anyway. Or did we turn them over to the locals to do the deed. In that case they became Ours, DE Ordurves in local villes. We didn't need attack dogs. We needed good dogs and for the most part that's what we had. We needed dogs that would tell you that somebody over in that direction smells of fermented fish guts. Dogs tended to be reflections of there handlers. Upbeat handler, upbeat dog off its leash and no muzzle. He could have one of my pork slices any day. The first question I asked when the pullouts were announced was "What's going to happen to the dogs?" I got stroked again.       

                                                                          

LZ Neville was quite defendable in my opinion. It had a cliff on its northern side that the grunts didn't have to worry about for the most part. However when the enemy shows up on your doorstep you have to start working him right away. We had plenty of opportunities for a dress rehearsal on LZ Neville. The enemy showed up right where they always did.     

Mike Robinson             Golf Battery 3rd Battalion 12th Marines            Vietnam 68-69

In Addition: The following was sent adding to Mike's story...

LZ Neville was a horrible operating position. It was solid rock. To simply make it flat enough to get the howitzers on its ridge we used tons of explosives. We would use forty pound shape charges to create a dished out spot then place forty percent dynamite in that dish and place rocks back on top of the dynamite to fracture the hill. We had one accidental secondary explosion that was absolutely amazing. A coiled line shot of C-4 was brought up to be used. It was the line that mine clearing amphibious tractors use to blow a path across mine fields. It was C-4 on a rope in five pound links. We were only about a hundred feet away when the line blew. All I saw was like a gray curtain in front of me. It even had dark lines in it vertically like a pleated curtain. The only thing that saved us was a small drop off cliff that the line was behind. The blast went up. we all went flying ass over tea kettle backwards. The treeline that separated us from the explosion was striped of all foliage.                     

After the guns were brought up from LZ Alpine we had lots of trouble with downed aiming stakes from rotor wash from supply choppers. In a 360 degree war that position was bad news. For example one trail mite unhook from the rock and the gun would start hopping sideways until one tire bounced into the high angle pit. My gun went out of action from a bent trail once. My gun at one time had a five foot long lanyard and still I can remember getting bopped around sometimes.                     

I learned a little bit about geology on that hill. I was whaling away on a rock with a pick when one of the experienced guys stopped me and pointed out the stress lines in it and showed me how to pick the rock apart. You can save yourself a lot of labor by looking a rock over before you go to work on it.                     

The bottom line was tube pointing was vary difficult on that hill. Although far from perfect that was the place a battery was needed.                   

In the weeks prior to the attack we were often probed by the NVA. I have all the letters I wrote home. In my last letter home before the attack I mentioned that "It is getting weird around here. The gooks cone up to our wire almost every night and then do nothing." Our enemy was training us. We were being acclimated to there presents by them. I think we lacked imagination in dealing with them. We needed to kill the NVA probing our position by setting ambushes close to our lines in the areas they repeatedly came to.                    

A few day before the attack Bravo Battery was sent OPCON to 3/12 to LZ Alpine. Along with it an accompanying grunt company form the 3rd Marines was sent for security that was OPCON to 1/4. General Davis in doing that out flanked the NVA and by turning the end almost ninety degrees obtained the perfect angle to support LZ Neville. A couple of days after Bravo Battery was placed on LZ Alpine Golf Battery was split. Three guns went to LZ Cates. I was on one of the guns that left LZ Neville. As it has turned out thirty years after the fact. That movement was in preparation for the attack. Earlier that in the day that we went to LZ Cates the 155's that were there were sent to Vandigrift CSB. That had to be in preparation for supporting LZ Russell. also India Battery had taken up position on LZ Fuller.                     

It's obvious now that our command knew quite a bit about that attack before it happened. The supporting batteries were placed properly. There may be something that wasn't properly understood. It may possibly be something like the difference between defending a position in Elephant grass rather than jungle. It may be harder defending on a jungle hilltop. A well planed and properly executed assault is hard to stop. Especially when the enemy is given a freebie to the positions wire. The NVA were inside the danger close artillery parameters on both hills before the alert was sounded. Artillery is like a big fly swatter. It kills everything in its radius.                     

The attack on LZ Neville was the key to the NVA's mass approach to the wire at LZ Russell. It worked perfectly. Had Hotel Battery not fired in support of LZ Neville that would have stopped the enemy from getting next to the wire at LZ Russell. Remember the speeches given at Khe Sanh earlier in this story. Positions like LZ Russell became vulnerable. At the enemies convenience LZ Russell was probed for soft spots. Every detail was worked out by the enemy. That position was hit from across a border we couldn't cross to preempt that attack even though our command knew it was coming. There is the axiom that fortresses are monuments to the stupidity of man. In this world of political boundaries and gerrymandering a fortress is not such a bad idea. A hundred years before LZ Russell or even a hundred years before that a military engineer would have been dispatched to that hill. One of the first things that engineer would have said was to get rid of that wrinkle in the topography that was the trash dump. That jump off point and the assembly area they used before that wouldn't have existed. We aren't smarter than those that came before us. When faced with static area defense we were horrible. A colonial period militarist would have scoffed at us and called us morons. If it was in that time miners (combat engineers to us) would have approached the perimeter and blown access holes in it. Troops with unloaded weapons with fixed bayonets would have flooded through the holes and put the cold steel to every man jack of us. We weren't as slick as we think we were.                    

Did Agent Orange open the countryside to the extent that troop movements wouldn't be trail bound. If that's the case it worked agents us at times.                     

The attack on 25 February was probably instrumental in setting the tactics for that last year for the Third Marine Division in Vietnam. We would have to continue to attack the NVA in our tactical area right to the last day. On February 27th a recon team was mauled on LZ Argon. One PFC. Jenkens would be awarded the Meddle Of Honor posthumously for his actions on that hill. Because of that and the attacks of 25 February the assault onto LZ Argon by 1/4 on 20 March was set. That assault was to be led by two 3rd recon. teams. To be followed by a company from 1/4. Golf Batteries three 105's were to be dropped into the gun pits as soon as the hill was secured. Ammunition was dropped to the guns. Tubes were leveled and the surrounding hillsides were raked. That's basically what happened however Murphy's Law kicked in big time and a big three ring donnybrook ensued. That was a direct result of the attacks of February 25 on LZ's Russell and Neville. But that's another story for another place.                     

One other thing as artillerymen always responding to attacks. We never had to sit there finding ourselves incapable of hitting back. No others can make that statement. We responded. We always responded.

                      

I rotated out in late August and was posted to Echo Battery with the 10th. Marines at Camp Le Jeune. I went on a MED Curse with 2nd Battalion 6th Marines. Completed my enlistment in late 1970. In 1978 I did a stint in the Marine reserves at Marine Air Reserve Training Unit (MARTU) Pasadena Ca. I became a MANPADS operator. That's (man portable air defense system) I.e. Red Eye Gunner. It was great. NBGP(no big grezzy pig) to take care of. You can take one of these Little Sidewinders and shoot it (and I did) place the expended tube into the ground and urinate into it. A well thought out system. That unit was transitioning onto the Stinger system as I finished my stint in the reserves. I found overall air defense to be the most fascinating chess game in the world.                     

I have lots of stories about my time in the Marines. Vietnam was only that time in combat if you want to call it that. I really don't talk about combat per say. I like telling stories like how my buddy put Loud Mouth Lime sugarless KoolAid in my last canteen of six that I carried while in combat. How I tried and what I did to protect myself from the tiger at LZ Alpine before it managed to eat somebody and it did eat somebody in the end. Or checking in at Balikashir Turkey with a group of reservists and the officer asked how we got there. My reply was we caught a hop from NAS Andrews AFB on a Marine VIP DC-4 with an E-9 cooking and feeding us grommet food all the way over. The officer said that an order of our cancellation in the operation was sent six weeks before. He said to start catching hops back to where we came from. You see there are a lot moor stories to tell. GOD has smiled upon Me!

Mike Robinson MRHogwood@aol.com